Three women journalists have alleged sexual harassment by Delhi Police personnel during the October 3 protest at Jantar Mantar. One of them has named ACP Vivek Bhagat and alleged that he sexually assaulted her while she was covering the detention of protesters. Delhi Police has acknowledged receiving all three complaints and has transferred them to the Crime Branch for what it has described as a fair and impartial inquiry.
Guilt cannot be presumed from a complaint, and the allegations will have to be investigated. But an investigation ordinarily begins with the registration of an FIR. Reports say that one of the journalists went to Parliament Street police station after the alleged incident and waited for hours for an FIR to be registered. The Press Club of India has expressed concern over the treatment of journalists and called for action. The circumstances surrounding those hours at the police station raise a question that can be examined without determining whether any officer committed an offence. It concerns what the law requires the police to do when a woman reports conduct that may constitute a cognizable offence, particularly when the person she is accusing belongs to the same institution to which she has turned for help.
India’s criminal procedure changed with the enactment of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, or BNSS. Section 173 deals with information relating to cognizable offences and allows such information to be given orally or electronically to the officer in charge of a police station, irrespective of where the offence occurred. Where the information discloses a cognizable offence, it is required to be recorded. The provision also contains a specific safeguard for women. Where a woman reports certain offences, including offences under Sections 74 and 75 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, the information is to be recorded by a woman police officer or any woman officer.
That safeguard could be relevant here because the allegations made public may attract precisely these provisions. Section 75 of the BNS deals with sexual harassment, including unwelcome physical contact and advances of a sexual nature. Section 74 concerns assault or criminal force against a woman with the intention of outraging her modesty, or with the knowledge that such conduct is likely to have that effect. The offence carries imprisonment of between one and five years and a fine. The precise provision applicable to the allegations cannot be determined from media reports. That is a matter for the investigating agency and, ultimately, the court. What can be said, however, is that registration of an FIR does not amount to a finding of guilt. It does not establish that the accused committed the offence. It sets the criminal investigation in motion.
This distinction was settled by the Supreme Court in Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh. A Constitution Bench held that registration of an FIR is mandatory when information given to the police discloses a cognizable offence. The Court also considered whether police officers could conduct a preliminary inquiry to determine the truthfulness of a complaint before registering an FIR. Its conclusion was that where the information discloses a cognizable offence, registration cannot ordinarily be withheld pending such an inquiry.
The principle matters because an FIR is not a declaration of guilt. At that stage, the police are not conducting a trial and are not deciding whether the accused is guilty. They are also not required to establish the truth of every allegation before an investigation can begin. Registration provides the legal starting point for an investigation, after which evidence can be collected, witnesses can be examined, statements can be recorded and medical examinations can be conducted where appropriate. The material gathered during that process can then be tested through the criminal justice system.
There are limited circumstances in which a preliminary inquiry may be permissible, particularly where the information does not clearly disclose a cognizable offence or falls within categories recognised by the Supreme Court. But such an inquiry cannot become a routine mechanism for delaying registration where the complaint itself discloses a cognizable offence. The distinction is important in a case involving allegations against police personnel because the institution receiving the complaint is also the institution to which the accused belong.
The law also places specific obligations on public servants. Section 199 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita provides for punishment where a public servant disobeys a direction under law, including, in specified circumstances, failure to record information as required under the BNSS concerning certain offences. The provision carries a punishment of rigorous imprisonment ranging from six months to two years, along with a fine. The statutory framework therefore does not treat the recording of complaints concerning specified offences merely as a matter of administrative preference. It places legal duties on public servants and attaches consequences to certain forms of failure to perform them.
This brings us to the institutional problem at the centre of the case. A woman alleges sexual misconduct by a police officer and approaches a police station to report it. The person she is accusing belongs to the same institution that receives her complaint. That institution controls the initial recording of information, the registration of the FIR and the beginning of the investigation. Even where there is no formal conflict of interest, such an arrangement can create a serious crisis of confidence for the complainant.
The transfer of the complaints to the Crime Branch therefore matters. Delhi Police has said that the complaints were transferred for a fair and impartial inquiry. Moving the matter away from the immediate police unit involved in the allegations can help create some distance between the accused officers and the investigation. But an inquiry by another unit of the same police force does not, by itself, resolve every question concerning institutional accountability. The first question remains whether the complaints were dealt with according to the applicable law and whether an FIR was registered where the information disclosed a cognizable offence. If it was not, the police should explain the legal basis for that decision.
The case also raises a separate concern because the complainants are journalists. They were covering a public protest at the time of the alleged misconduct. Journalists documenting arrests, detentions, the use of force or police action can inevitably find themselves in situations of friction with the authorities. That friction, however, cannot become a justification for compromising the safety or professional freedom of journalists. The work of documenting the exercise of state power is itself an essential part of journalism, particularly when the actions of public authorities are contested.
The allegations therefore raise two connected but distinct questions of accountability. The first concerns the alleged sexual misconduct and whether the facts establish a criminal offence. The second concerns the treatment of journalists while they were carrying out their professional duties and whether the conduct alleged against police personnel interfered with their ability to report on a public event. The two questions should be investigated separately while recognising the circumstances in which they arose.
It would be premature to pronounce anyone guilty on the basis of allegations that remain to be investigated. The same principle of fairness that protects an accused from being declared guilty without due process also requires that a complainant should have access to the legal process through which her allegations can be investigated. The criminal justice system exists precisely because allegations have to be tested through evidence and procedure. It should not require a complainant to establish the truth of her allegations before the process designed to establish that truth is allowed to begin.
This is why the question of an FIR is so important. Registration does not determine the outcome of the case. It does not prevent an accused person from defending themselves. It does not remove the requirement for evidence. It simply ensures that a complaint disclosing a cognizable offence enters the formal criminal justice process and can be investigated according to law.
The issue becomes particularly sensitive when the accused is a police officer because the police exercise considerable coercive power over citizens. They register complaints, conduct investigations, make arrests and enforce criminal law. That authority is accompanied by an obligation to remain accountable to the same legal framework. The credibility of policing depends not merely on the power of the institution to enforce the law against citizens but also on its willingness to apply legal standards to its own personnel.
The response to allegations against a police officer therefore becomes a test of the institution itself. If the allegations are found to be false, the investigation should establish that through evidence and procedure. If the allegations are substantiated, the same process should ensure that the accused is held accountable. But neither outcome can be reached fairly if the initial complaint is kept outside the formal process that allows evidence to be collected and tested.
The larger concern is therefore not simply whether one ACP or any other officer committed the acts alleged. That question must be answered through investigation and, where necessary, adjudication by a court. The larger institutional question is whether the police can provide a complainant with the same access to law when the accused happens to be a member of the police force.
For women who report crimes, the police station is supposed to be a point of entry into the justice system. For journalists covering the exercise of state power, the police are also an institution whose actions must remain open to scrutiny. When the two roles intersect and a journalist alleges sexual misconduct by a police officer, the response of the police carries significance far beyond the individual complaint.
The credibility of the investigation will ultimately depend on whether the allegations are examined fairly, whether the complainants receive the protections provided to them under law, whether the accused are afforded due process and whether the police follow the statutory procedure governing the registration and investigation of cognizable offences.
The question of police accountability therefore begins before a court determines whether an offence took place. It begins with what the institution does when a complaint is brought before it. If the police expect citizens to trust the law, that trust can only be sustained when the police themselves demonstrate that they are prepared to operate within it, particularly when one of their own personnel stands accused.
